Abstract-Buyer-seller watermarking protocols allow copyright protection of digital goods. To protect privacy, some of those protocols provide buyers with anonymity. However, anonymous e-commerce protocols pose several disadvantages, like hindering customer management or requiring anonymous payment mechanisms. Additionally, no existing buyer-seller watermarking protocol provides fair exchange. We propose a novel approach for the design of privacy-preserving buyer-seller watermarking protocols. In our approach, the seller authenticates buyers but does not learn which items are purchased. Since buyers are not anonymous, customer management is eased and currently deployed methods of payment can be utilized. We define an ideal functionality for privacy-preserving copyright protection protocols. To realize our functionality, a protocol must ensure that buyers pay the right price without disclosing the purchased item, and that sellers are able to identify buyers that released pirated copies. We construct a protocol based on priced oblivious transfer and on existing techniques for asymmetric watermark embedding. Furthermore, we implement and evaluate the efficiency of our protocol, and we explain how to extend it in order to achieve optimistic fair exchange.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE rapid development of communication networks has led to a situation that facilitates online e-commerce of digital goods. However, it also poses threats to copyright protection and to customers' privacy. On the one hand, distribution of illegal copies is eased, and thus mechanisms that allow the protection of intellectual property rights are needed. On the other hand, information about which items are bought can reveal sensitive data about the buyer. This information can easily be shared among service providers to create personal profiles. Consequently, privacy concerns discourage online e-commerce [1] , and regulations to enforce privacy protection are being promulgated [2] . The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Robert H. Deng.
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1) Previous Work:
Fingerprinting schemes deter people from illegally redistributing digital copies by enabling the seller of the data to identify the buyer. A scheme is said to be collusion-resistant [3] when it prevents a collusion of buyers up to a maximum size from producing nontraceable copies. In asymmetric fingerprinting schemes [4] , the fingerprinted copy is only known to the buyer at the end of the purchase protocol. Thanks to this property, when the seller finds a redistributed copy, he can present it as a proof of the buyer's misbehavior, and the buyer cannot claim that the copy was produced by the seller. In order to protect privacy, fingerprinting protocols that provide buyers with anonymity have been proposed [5] .
Buyer-seller watermarking protocols [6] are asymmetric fingerprinting schemes in which the fingerprint is embedded by means of watermarking techniques. The basic idea is that each buyer obtains a slightly different copy of the digital content. Such difference, the watermark, does not harm the quality of the copy and cannot be removed by the buyer. Some buyer-seller watermarking protocols also provide buyers with anonymity [7] - [9] .
As noted in [10] , anonymous e-commerce protocols have several disadvantages. First, they hinder customer management. For example, the seller cannot give discounts to regular buyers or apply other loyalty marketing techniques. Second, they have to be used together with anonymous payment protocols (e.g., anonymous e-cash [11] ), which makes it impossible to use currently deployed payment protocols. Finally, they require the use of an underlying anonymous communication network, such as Tor [12] . It is well-known that achieving strong anonymity in such networks is a difficult goal [13] . Furthermore, some applications allow side-channel attacks against anonymity. For example, in location-based services, the service provider learns a customer's location, and this information can be used to identify the a priori anonymous customer [14] .
Additionally, e-commerce protocols are usually analyzed in order to prove their fairness [15] . Roughly speaking, fair exchange ensures that, at the end of the transaction, either the seller receives the payment and the buyer receives the purchased item, or both parties receive nothing. However, to the best of our knowledge, no fair buyer-seller watermarking protocol has been proposed.
2) Our Contribution: We propose a different approach to provide privacy protection in buyer-seller watermarking protocols. In our approach, based on oblivious e-commerce protocols, buyers are authenticated by the seller, but the seller does not learn which items are purchased. This overcomes the disadvantages of anonymous purchase. Since buyers are authenticated, customer management is eased and currently deployed methods of payment can be utilized. As possible disadvantages, one can argue that the seller can find it difficult to learn which items are more demanded, e.g., to adapt his catalogue of products or to pay copyright owners. However, as noted in [10] , this information can be obtained by other means, e.g., by conducting marketing research.
We define formally privacy-preserving buyer-seller watermarking (PBSW) protocols, i.e., buyer-seller watermarking protocols in which the seller does not learn which items are purchased. We also provide a construction of such a protocol based on existing techniques for asymmetric watermark embedding and on priced oblivious transfer (POT). (POT is the key building block of oblivious e-commerce protocols.) Finally, we explain how to extend our protocol to provide fair exchange.
3) Outline of the Paper: In Section II, we recall the definition of POT and we define PBSW protocols. We recall the definition of watermarking and of other cryptographic building blocks utilized in our construction in Section III. In Section IV, we describe our construction, and we analyze its security in Section V. Additionally, we explain how to extend our construction to achieve fairness in Section VI, and we discuss its efficiency in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII draws a conclusion and discusses future work.
II. DEFINITIONS

A. Security Model
We define security following the ideal-world/real-world paradigm [16] . In the real world, a set of parties interact according to the protocol description in the presence of a real adversary , while in the ideal world dummy parties interact with an ideal functionality that carries out the desired task in the presence of an ideal adversary . A protocol is secure if there exists no environment that can distinguish whether it is interacting with adversary and parties running protocol or with the ideal process for carrying out the desired task, where ideal adversary and dummy parties interact with an ideal functionality . More formally, we say that protocol emulates the ideal process when, for any adversary , there exists a simulator such that for all environments , the ensembles and are computationally indistinguishable. By applying the universal composition theorem [16] , a protocol that realizes functionality remains secure even when it is composed along with an unbounded number of protocol instances controlled by the adversary. We refer to [16] for a description of how these ensembles are constructed. Every functionality and every protocol invocation should be instantiated with a unique session-ID that distinguishes it from other instantiations. For the sake of ease of notation, we omit session-IDs from the description of our ideal functionalities.
B. Priced Oblivious Transfer
POT [17] is a two-party protocol between a seller and a buyer , where sells a set of messages with prices to . At each purchase, chooses , gets , and pays . must learn neither nor , while must not learn anything about the other messages. We recall the ideal functionality for POT in [10] .
Functionality
Parameterized with the number of messages , the message length , the maximum price , and the maximum deposit , and running with a seller and buyers , works as follows: 
C. Privacy-Preserving Copyright Protection Protocol
We describe an ideal functionality that models the behavior and desirable properties of any privacy-preserving copyright protection protocol, i.e., a copyright protection protocol in which buyers do not disclose to the seller which items are bought. We consider a setting with three parties: a seller that sells protected messages ; a set of buyers that purchase protected messages from ; and a judge that decides whether a buyer is guilty of releasing pirated copies. is parameterized with a set of parties that contains the aforementioned entities. models the properties that the protocol should fulfill under three assumptions. First, the judge is never corrupted by the ideal adversary . Second, parties can be corrupted statically, i.e., the ideal adversary decides at the beginning of the protocol execution the set of parties it wishes to corrupt and cannot modify this set throughout the execution. Finally, assumes that uncorrupted buyers never release pirated copies.
Under those assumptions, requires that buyers, after making an initial deposit, purchase items from the seller by disclosing neither the item bought nor the amount of money paid. This requirement must hold both when the seller is honest and when he is corrupted.
In addition, when the seller is uncorrupted, buyers receive a unique protected message at each purchase. This unique protected message, when released as a pirated copy, can be traced back to the corrupted buyer that released it. In our construction, unique protected messages are computed by embedding different watermarks into the original content.
When the seller is corrupted, does not require the seller to send unique protected messages . However, it requires that is not able to frame uncorrupted buyers, who by assumption do not release pirated copies.
Below we describe formally . In Section V, we prove that our PBSW protocol realizes functionality . This means that our protocol fulfills the aforementioned properties.
Functionality
Parameterized with the number of messages , the message length , the maximum price , and the maximum deposit
, Informally speaking, the requirements a protocol should fulfill in order to realize functionality can be summarized as follows:
• Correctness. The protocol should terminate successfully whenever its parties are honest.
• Traceability. Upon finding a pirated copy, should always be able to trace and identify the buyer that released it.
• Nonframeability. An honest buyer cannot be found guilty of releasing pirated copies.
• Direct Nonrepudiation. A guilty buyer cannot deny she released the pirated copy. Additionally, can convince a third party that is guilty without needing interaction with .
• Privacy. does not learn which contents are purchased.
• Antifraud. is assured that pays the right price and that cannot purchase when running out of funds.
D. Registration Authority
In Section V, we prove that our buyer-seller watermarking protocol realizes functionality in the -hybrid model, where parties register their public keys at a trusted registration entity. Below we depict the ideal functionality given in [16] .
is parameterized with a set of participants , which is restricted to contain the buyers , the seller , and the judge .
can be implemented with a public key infrastructure.
Functionality
Parameterized with a set of parties , works as follows:
• Upon receiving from party , it records the value .
• Upon receiving from party , if is recorded then return to . Otherwise send to .
III. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
We recall the definition of watermarking and of other cryptographic building blocks utilized in our construction. Some subsections and notation utilized here and in Sections IV-VIII are taken verbatim from [18] .
A. Blind Watermarking
A blind and readable watermarking scheme [19] consists of a setup algorithm , a watermark embedding algorithm , and a watermark detection algorithm . outputs a secret watermarking key , a message space , and a watermark space .
, on input , message , and watermark , outputs a watermarked message . The algorithm can be computed in the encrypted domain, where both and the result are encrypted with a public key of a public key encryption scheme. The algorithm outputs the watermark embedded in .
A secure watermarking scheme should be robust and collusion resistant. Let be a distortion metric that quantifies the distortion suffered by a watermarked content when it underwent signal processing operations such as compression, filtering, noise addition, desynchronization, cropping, insertions, mosaicing, and collage. Let be a distorted content. The robustness property requires that under a distortion metric and a distortion bound , given output by and output by , outputs with overwhelming probability if . The collusion resistance property [20] requires that a collusion of up to parties cannot manipulate or remove the watermark from a watermarked content by comparing or composing their differently watermarked copies. This property can be formalized as follows:
Definition 1 (Collusion Resistant Watermarking):
The collusion resistance property is defined through the following game between a challenger and an adversary .
• Challenge. runs to get , picks random original content , and, for to , picks random watermark and runs . sends to .
• Response. outputs watermarked content . wins if there exists such that and outputs a watermark such that, for to ,
. A blind watermarking scheme is collusion resistant if all p.p.t. adversaries win the game above with negligible probability.
Current practical watermarking schemes do not provide collusion-resistance against any p.p.t. adversary. In Section V, we assume that the watermarking scheme used to instantiate the protocol fulfills this definition, and thus we conclude that our protocol is secure against any p.p.t. adversary. When the protocol is instantiated with a concrete watermarking scheme, the security offered against malicious buyers is lowered to the security offered by the watermarking scheme.
B. Signature Schemes
A signature scheme consists of the algorithms , , and . outputs a secret key and a public key . outputs a signature of message . outputs if is a valid signature of and otherwise. A signature scheme must be correct and unforgeable [21] . Informally speaking, correctness implies that the algorithm always accepts an honestly generated signature. Existential unforgeability means that no p.p.t. adversary should be able to output a message-signature pair unless he has previously obtained a signature on . We can employ any existentially unforgeable signature scheme to instantiate the signature scheme employed by buyers in our construction in Section IV.
C. Homomorphic Encryption
A public key encryption scheme consists of the algorithms , , and . outputs a public key and a secret key .
outputs a ciphertext on input a public key and a message . outputs the message on input the ciphertext and the secret key . Roughly speaking, indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack [22] (IND-CPA) guarantees that an adversary does not get any knowledge about from . We employ a homomorphic public key encryption scheme that supports two operations. An operation that, on input two ciphertexts and that encrypt messages and , outputs a ciphertext that encrypts the addition of the messages, and an operation that, on input a message and a ciphertext , outputs a ciphertext that encrypts the multiplication of the messages and . The homomorphic public key encryption scheme proposed by Paillier [23] , and its generalization by Damgård and Jurik [24] , support these operations, and therefore can be used to instantiate the encryption scheme employed in Section IV.
In our construction in Section IV, we need a function that, on input a bit and an encryption of a bit , computes the encryption , where denotes the exclusive or operation. This function can be computed as follows. If , output . If , output .
D. Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [25] is a two-party protocol between a prover and a verifier. The prover proves to the verifier knowledge of some secret input that fulfills some statement without disclosing this input to the verifier. The protocol should fulfill two properties. First, it should be a proof of knowledge, i.e., a prover without the knowledge of the secret input convinces the verifier with negligible probability. More technically, there exists a knowledge extractor that extracts the secret input from a successful prover with all but negligible probability. Second, it should be zero-knowledge, i.e., the verifier does not learn any information about the secret input. More technically, for all possible verifiers there exists a simulator that, without knowledge of the secret input, yields a transcript that cannot be distinguished from the interaction with a real prover.
To express a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, we follow the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [26] . For example, denotes a " zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of secret input such that ." Letters in the parenthesis, in this example , denote the secret input, while and the function are also known to the verifier. We employ a proof of knowledge , i.e., a proof that is a correct encryption under of the secret key related with public key , so that a party in possession of the secret key related with can recover from . The verifiable encryption schemes proposed by Camenisch et al. [27] and by Poupard and Stern [28] , which are provided with such a proof of knowledge, can be employed to instantiate the encryption scheme used in our construction in Section IV. We also use a proof of knowledge of the statement , i.e., a proof that the value encrypted in ciphertext under public key is a bit. Such a proof is described in [24] .
IV. PBSW PROTOCOL
A. Intuition Behind Our Construction
Our PBSW protocol is based on POT. POT allows buyers to purchase messages from the seller without the seller learning which messages are bought (see Section II). Existing secure POT schemes follow an assisted decryption approach in which the interaction between a seller and a buyer is divided into an initialization phase and several purchase phases. In the initialization phase, encrypts the messages to be sold and sends the ciphertexts to . In each purchase phase, helps to decrypt one of the ciphertexts via an interactive protocol.
To allow for payments, existing POT schemes employ a prepaid mechanism. In the initialization phase, makes an initial deposit to , and, in each purchase phase, debits the price of the message from the deposit and proves to that the remaining deposit is nonnegative. is able to verify those facts by learning neither the price of the message nor the new value of the deposit.
We note that, to achieve full privacy, the initial deposit should be higher than the price of the most expensive item. Additionally, it is possible for the buyer to hide when she is buying something by having the seller include a dummy item with price zero.
Our PBSW protocol combines POT with existing techniques for asymmetric watermark embedding. In particular, we use a simplified version of the buyer-seller watermarking protocol in [18] , in which buyers are not provided with anonymity. This protocol employs homomorphic encryption to allow and to jointly compute an encryption (with the public key of ) of the watermark to be embedded in the message, in such a way that none of the parties knows the watermark. This prevents both a malicious seller from releasing pirated copies with the same watermark in order to frame the buyer, and a malicious buyer that releases pirated copies from invoking the possibility of being framed by the seller.
Additionally, the protocol involves a judge to resolve disputes between and . To this end, sends to a key escrow ciphertext that encrypts her secret key with the public key of the judge . When accuses of releasing pirated copies, sends this ciphertext to so that can recover 's secret key. With the secret key, can check whether is guilty or not guilty.
Our PBSW protocol consists of four phases: setup, initialization, purchase, and arbitration. In the setup phase, and create key pairs and register their public keys with the registration authority. computes a secret watermarking key.
In the initialization phase, and run an interactive protocol for asymmetric watermark embedding. As result, obtains a set of watermarks, encrypted with the public key of , to be embedded in each of the messages. Each watermark is of the form , where and are randomly chosen by and , respectively, and is a random string, unique for each released content, chosen by . By using signal processing in the encrypted domain techniques, embeds the watermarks and obtains encrypted watermarked messages. These watermarked messages are given as input to the seller initialization algorithm of the POT scheme, which produces ciphertexts to be sent to . 1 After that, the initialization phase follows that of the POT scheme.
The purchase phases follow those of the POT scheme, except that as a result, obtains a watermarked message encrypted with her public key. decrypts the result to obtain the watermarked message. In the arbitration phase, when claims to have found a pirated copy, employs the watermark detection algorithm to obtain the watermark . sends the identity of the alleged pirate, i.e., the buyer , that received the content whose watermark included . checks whether is guilty or not guilty.
Our construction employs authenticated channels. In its description, we employ a single watermarking key . If, in order for the watermarking scheme to be collusion-resistant, a different watermarking key should be associated to each of the 1 If the encrypted watermarked messages do not belong to the message space of the POT scheme used, its message space can be modified. For example, in the POT scheme in [29] , a ciphertext of message m consists of elements (A; B), where B = e(g;A) 8 m for a bilinear map e : 2 ! and a generator g of . A hash function H can be used to map e(g;A) to the key space of a secure symmetric key encryption scheme. The message is then encrypted via the symmetric key encryption scheme utilizing H(e (g;A) ) as key.
original contents, our construction can be modified to watermark each content with a different key.
B. Syntax for POT Schemes
Our construction can be instantiated with any POT scheme that realizes , such as [10] and [29] . Following the syntax for POT proposed in [29] , a POT scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• A seller initialization algorithm that, on input the security parameter , message-price pairs and the maximum deposit , outputs a secret key , a public key and a set of ciphertexts .
• • A response verification algorithm that, on input the public key and the response , verifies the response and outputs either or .
• An algorithm that, on input the ciphertexts , the response and trapdoor information , outputs the message .
C. Construction
In the following, and stand for the algorithms for key generation, encryption, and decryption of the public key encryption schemes used by and , respectively. They are described in Section III. Additionally, are the algorithms for key generation, signing, and signature verification of the signature scheme used by .
In the setup phase, each buyer runs to obtain a key pair and registers at . The judge runs his key generation algorithm in order to generate a key pair and registers at . Every party can retrieve public keys of other parties by querying . The seller executes the watermarking setup algorithm to obtain a secret watermarking key . The following phases are depicted in Fig. 1 V. SECURITY ANALYSIS Theorem 1: This PBSW scheme securely realizes . In order to prove this theorem, we need to build a simulator that invokes a copy of adversary and interacts with and environment in such a way that ensembles and are computationally indistinguishable. We prove security of our protocol under the assumption that it is instantiated with a secure POT scheme, i.e., one that realizes functionality described in Section II. The security of the POT scheme implies the existence of a simulator that interacts with and in such a way that cannot distinguish the ideal world from the real world. Our simulator employs simulator . We analyze formally the security of our scheme when the seller and a subset of buyers are corrupted, and when (a subset of) buyers are corrupted. We denote by a negligible function.
A. Security Analysis When Seller is Corrupted
Claim 1: When the seller and a subset of the buyers are corrupted, the ensembles and are computationally indistinguishable under the security of the POT scheme, the zero-knowledge property of the proofs of knowledge, the IND-CPA security of encryption schemes and , and the unforgeability of the signature scheme . Proof: We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment cannot distinguish between the real execution ensemble and the simulated ensemble with nonnegligible probability. We denote by the probability that distinguishes between the ensemble of and that of the real execution.
• : This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol with a subset of honest buyers and an honest . Thus .
• : This game proceeds as , except that aborts if sends a message-signature pair correct according to algorithm , where is the public key of an honest buyer and such that did not obtain before a signature of message for public key . The probability that aborts is bounded by the following lemma. Lemma 1: Under the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme , .
Proof: Given an adversary that makes abort with nonnegligible probability , we construct an algorithm that breaks the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme with nonnegligible probability , where denotes the number of honest buyers. Existential unforgeability is formally defined in [21] as a game between a challenger and an adversary. First, gives to the adversary a public key and access to a signing oracle . Eventually, outputs a message signature pair , and wins the game if outputs and was not queried on input . Algorithm operates as follows. First, receives from . chooses an honest buyer , and, when queries the public key of , sends . To simulate a purchase request from , queries on input the purchase message to obtain and sends to . Eventually, sends a pair such that aborts. If is not associated with public key , fails. Otherwise, submits to .
• : This game proceeds as , except that the proofs and are replaced by simulated proofs. Under the assumption that the proof system is zero-knowledge, .
• : This game proceeds as , except that the ciphertext included in the initialization message of buyers is replaced by a ciphertext that encrypts a random message. At this point, the proof of knowledge is a simulated proof of a false statement. The probability that distinguishes between and is bounded by the following lemma. Lemma 2: Under the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme that consists of algorithms , . Proof: We construct an algorithm that, given an environment that distinguishes and with nonnegligible probability, breaks the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme with nonnegligible probability. Chosen plaintext security is formally defined through a game between a challenger and an adversary [22] . First, provides the adversary with a public key . The adversary sends two messages and . flips a coin and sends to the adversary. Finally, the adversary sends his guess and wins if is nonnegligible. Let be the number of honest buyers. We consider a sequence of hybrid games, where, in game-, ciphertext is replaced by the encryption of a random message in the initialization messages of buyers , while the remaining requests remain unchanged. Clearly, game-0 corresponds to and game-corresponds to
. If distinguishes and with nonnegligible probability , there must be an index such that distinguishes game-from gamewith nonnegligible probability . Our algorithm operates as follows. First, receives the public key from . When requests the public key of , sends . Initialization messages of buyers are com-puted following algorithm , except that is replaced by the encryption of a random value and and by simulated proofs. For , initialization messages are computed following algorithm . For , computes to obtain a key pair , picks random and submits to . flips a coin and returns , and uses to compute the request. If , the distribution corresponds to game-, and, if , it corresponds to game-. outputs a bit , which is forwarded by to .
• : This game proceeds as , except that aborts upon receiving an arbitration request , where was previously sent to , is associated with the public key of an honest buyer and was the buyer's watermark sent by in the initialization phase. The probability that distinguishes between and is bounded by the following lemma. Lemma 3: Under the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme that consists of algorithms , . Proof: Let be the number of honest buyers. We construct an algorithm that, given an adversary that makes abort with nonnegligible probability, breaks the chosen plaintext security of the encryption scheme with nonnegligible probability . Algorithm operates as follows. First, receives a public key from . To compute the initialization message of , follows and uses to encrypt bitwise and obtain . To encrypt the first , encrypts bitwise using . To encrypt the last bit, sends (0,1) to and receives back a ciphertext , which is used to complete the bitwise encryption. To compute the initialization message of buyers , follows . Eventually sends an arbitration message that makes abort. If , fails. Otherwise, if the last bit of is 0, sends to , and otherwise to .
• : This game proceeds as , except that performs all the changes described in for the case in which sender and a subset of buyers are corrupted. Under the security of the POT scheme, we have that . performs all the changes described in , and forwards and receives messages from as described in our simulation as follows:
• • Arbitration. Upon receiving a framing message from , aborts if any of the conditions described up to are fulfilled. (We showed that aborts with negligible probability.) Those conditions prevent from framing honest buyers, who by assumption do not release pirated copies. If does not abort, picks any pirated copy in and sends to . Upon receiving , sends (guilty) to . The distribution produced in is identical to that of our simulation. By summation we have that .
B. Security Analysis When Buyers are Corrupted
Claim 2: When only the buyers are corrupted, the ensembles and are computationally indistinguishable under the security of the POT scheme, the unforgeability of the signature scheme , and the collusion resistance of the watermarking scheme.
Proof: We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment cannot distinguish between the real execution ensemble and the simulated ensemble with nonnegligible probability.
• : This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol with honest and . Therefore, .
• : This game operates as , except that the string that is used to compute the watermark embedding is replaced by a random string. Since the strings and are picked at random by the honest seller, is a random string that leaks no information on . Therefore, .
• : This game operates as , except that aborts if releases a watermarked content whose watermark does not equal that of any of the watermarked contents previously received by . The probability that aborts is bounded by the following lemma. Lemma 4: Under the assumption that the watermarking scheme is collusion resistant, . Proof: We construct an algorithm that, given an adversary that makes abort with nonnegligible probability, breaks the collusion resistant property of the watermarking scheme with nonnegligible probability. interacts with the challenger of the collusion resistant game described in Definition 1. First, receives the challenge from . computes the public key of and sends to upon request. employs as the watermarked copy of messages . (We assume that is larger than the number of buyers .) For other items, the watermarked copies are computed as usual. Eventually, releases a pirated copy that corresponds to whose watermark does not equal any of the watermarks embedded in . forwards to .
• : This game proceeds as , except that performs all the changes described in for the case in which the buyers are corrupted. Under the security of the POT scheme, we have that . performs all the changes described in , and forwards and receives messages from as described in our simulation below:
• • Release. Upon receiving a pirated copy from , sends to . The distribution produced in is identical to that of our simulation. By summation we have that .
VI. FAIR PRIVACY-PRESERVING BSW PROTOCOL
Recently, a transformation that takes as input a secure POT scheme and turns it into an optimistic fair POT scheme has been proposed [29] . This transformation requires a neutral third party, an adjudicator, who is only involved in case of dispute between a seller and a buyer (hence the protocol is called optimistic).
Other fair e-commerce protocols that do not protect privacy also require the involvement of a third party [30] .
The transformation is based on the use of verifiably encrypted signatures (VES) [31] . Roughly speaking, a VES is a signature encrypted under the public key of the adjudicator that can be publicly verified; i.e., the verifier can check that the ciphertext contains a valid signature without the secret key of the adjudicator.
The transformation works as follows. The buyer computes a VES on her purchase request , and sends to the seller.
Upon receiving a correct response from seller, the buyer reveals a valid signature on her request. This signature can be used by the seller to prove that the buyer accepted the result and that a payment was done. If a malicious buyer does not reveal the signature, the adjudicator, upon being requested by the seller, can verify that the seller fulfilled his delivery obligations and, in that case, extract a valid signature from the VES . Similarly, if a malicious seller does not fulfill his delivery obligations, the adjudicator, upon being requested by the buyer, can tell the seller to fulfill them and, in the end, send the seller a valid signature. We refer to [29] for a detailed description. One of the appealing properties of this transformation is that it adds very little overhead in terms of communication and computation. Our PBSW protocol can also be extended to achieve fairness by applying this transformation to the POT scheme used as a building block. In our protocol, the role of the adjudicator can be played by the judge. Both judge and buyers have to compute a key pair as defined in the VES scheme used and register the public key at the registration authority.
VII. EFFICIENCY
The efficiency of our construction depends on the efficiency of the building blocks used to instantiate it. Efficiency measurements for the asymmetric watermark embedding technique we employ (algorithms , , , ) can be found in [9] , which describes and implements an instantiation based on the homomorphic public key encryption scheme due to Paillier [23] . In [9] , images of size 512 512 pixels are employed as digital content offered by , whose size after embedding the watermark in the encrypted domain is 536, 870, 912 bits when each DCT coefficient is encrypted, or 6, 318, 080 bits when composite signal representation is used. In the following, we employ watermarked messages of those sizes as input to the POT scheme.
To evaluate the performance of the whole PBSW protocol, we implement the POT scheme proposed in [29] in a workstation equipped with an IntelCore2Duo processor at 3 GHz and 4 Gbyte of RAM. All the functionalities are implemented in the C programming language. We use the PBC library 2 for elliptic curve and pairing operations. We select type A pairings constructed on the curve over the field for a 512-bit prime mod 4. For other cryptographic primitives, we employ the OpenSSL library. 3 Specifically, we employ RIPEMD-160 [32] as hash function and AES [33] in counter mode as block cipher.
The efficiency of the POT scheme in [29] in terms of computation and communication depends on the selection of three parameters: the number of messages offered by , the size of the watermarked messages, and the values and that define the maximum deposit allowed . The performance of the initialization phase (algorithms and ) depends on the number of messages and on the message size. Table I shows performance  measurements when is 100, 1000, and 10 000, and when the message size is 536, 870, 912 and 6, 318, 080 bits. As can be seen that the computation and communication complexity of both algorithms grows linearly with , because The efficiency of the purchase phase does not depend on , while the message size only affects algorithm . However, it depends on the maximum deposit allowed , because this parameter determines the efficiency of a range proof that is computed by to show that her account is nonnegative. Table II shows the measurements of the purchase phase for a message size of 6, 318, 080 bits and . is 100, 1000, and 10 000, respectively, with fixed value , and , respectively. The value influences the computation and communication cost during and . 4 As can be seen, our protocol consists of an expensive initialization phase, whose cost grows linearly with the amount of messages and the message size, and very cheap purchase phases. In contrast, anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocols consist of a cheap initialization phase and expensive transfer phases. Therefore, our protocol is more convenient in resource constrained settings because the initialization phase needs to be run only once, and later on a lot of very cheap purchase phases can be carried out.
An alternative to our PBSW protocol, which also preserves buyer's privacy by hiding from vendors which items are bought, would employ private information retrieval (PIR) [34] . Basically, the idea would be as follows. In the initialization phase, when the seller computes , for to , picks randomly a key for a secure symmetric key encryption scheme, and encrypts . Keys are given as input messages to the POT protocol, and are given as input messages of 4 The value u affects the efficiency of the initialization phase, but its influence is negligible when the message size is big. The most efficient choice in our case would be to fix l = 1.
the PIR scheme. To purchase a message, a buyer obtains the symmetric key via the POT scheme, then obtains via the PIR scheme, and finally decrypts with to obtain . After that, this alternative would follow the PBSW protocol.
Since the size of the keys is smaller than the encrypted watermarked messages , the communication complexity of the initialization phase of the POT scheme decreases. However, after obtaining , has to perform a PIR query to obtain . Most efficient computational PIR schemes achieve logsquared communication complexity in the database size [35] , [36] . Therefore, if the number of purchases is expected to be small, this alternative would be more appealing. However, when the number of purchases is big, our PBSW protocol is more efficient since the communication complexity of purchase phases is constant. The exact threshold for the number of purchases in which our PBSW is more efficient depends on the concrete POT and PIR schemes used to instantiate both constructions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
